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N1VsKARc
      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     ALI KARIMI, Individually and on
     Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
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                     Plaintiffs,
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                                             22 Civ. 2854 (JSR)
                v.
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      DEUTSCHE BANK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, et al.,
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                    Defendants.
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                                              New York, N.Y.
                                              January 31, 2023
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                                              9:00 a.m.
     Before:
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                            HON. JED S. RAKOFF,
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                                              District Judge
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                                APPEARANCES
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     POMERANTZ LLP
          Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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     BY: JEREMY LIEBERMAN
          BRIAN CALANDRA
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          DOLGORA DORZHIEVA
     CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP
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          Attorneys for Defendants
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     BY: DAVID JANUSZEWSKI
          NICHOLAS MATUSCHAK
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1 (Case called) 2 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Will the parties please draw a 3 microphone close to them and identify themselves for the 4 record. 5 Ma'am, you've got one right in front of you. Pull it 6 closer. 7 MR. LIEBERMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Jeremy Lieberman, Pomerantz LLP, on behalf of the 8 9 class members. 10 MS. DORZHIEVA: Good morning, your Honor. 11 Emma Dorzhieva on behalf of the plaintiffs as well. 12 THE COURT: Good morning. 13 MR. CALANDRA: Brian Calandra, Pomerantz LLP, on 14 behalf of the plaintiffs. 15 MR. JANUSZEWSKI: Good morning, your Honor. David Januszewski, Cahill Gordon, for the defendants. 16 17

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. MATUSCHAK: Nicholas Matuschak, also from Cahill, also for the defendants.

THE COURT: Good morning.

All right. Please be seated.

So I had already examined the settlement at the time of the preliminary approval and I've now reexamined it. And with one exception, I'm prepared to approve it, finding that it meets all the requirements of Rule 23 and is fair, adequate,

and reasonable.

The one question I have, and I'll hear from counsel, is a request for 33 percent attorneys' fees which seems to me to be high given both the recent history in this circuit and more generally throughout the United States to reduce fees to about 25 percent in such cases.

Second, because the settlement was reached fairly early on without extraordinary work by counsel for either side, and the lodestar within the permissible range is on the high side.

Third, perhaps most importantly, it can never be forgotten that every penny that goes to counsel is a penny less that goes to the victims. The point of contingent fees is to create a sufficient incentive that able counsel, such as we have here, will be attracted to entering into the case. But it is impossible for me to believe that counsel would not have been willing to take on this case if the fee had been, say, capped automatically at 25 percent rather than 33 percent.

But before I make any final decision, let me hear from plaintiff's counsel.

MR. LIEBERMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

So to address the point on the fees. We do believe that one third is well within the range in this circuit.

THE COURT: The history, I think, if you look at the cases throughout the United States, you can see that fees in

this area are steady moving down as a percentage.

Now, there are exceptions to that trend and every case is different and every case must be evaluated individually, but I don't think there is some rule that it should be 33 percent.

MR. LIEBERMAN: Well, I'm not sure that there is a rule on it, your Honor.

THE COURT: Pardon?

MR. LIEBERMAN: I'm not sure that there is a rule either.

THE COURT: That's good. I'm glad we're agreeing on something.

MR. LIEBERMAN: We do agree on something, your Honor, but I do think we do depart where -- we do think a fee of one third is well within the range and fees like that are already being approved in this circuit, in this court, in the Southern District as well.

Your Honor recently in  $Gruber\ v.\ Gilbertson$  approved a one third fee.

THE COURT: I'm not saying that it's not within a permissible range that could be approved. I'm saying that on the facts of this case and looking at it as increasingly, as I am inclined to do, as to what would be necessary to bring excellent firms like the Pomerantz firm into the case like this, if you have been told at the outset the fee will be 25 percent, neither more or less, are you saying you would not

have entered the case?

MR. LIEBERMAN: Your Honor, it might have been a different discussion. I don't know what we would have done. I can't rewrite the history of that. We do have discussions with our plaintiffs on cases and often we do push back on fees and sometimes we will not take 25 percent. I don't know what we would have done here, to be frank.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. LIEBERMAN: But thus far, the case did go on for two years. There was a significant amount of work done in the case. We're requesting --

THE COURT: That's why I'm not considering five or 10 percent.

MR. LIEBERMAN: Yes. We are lucky about that, your Honor. We can count our blessings. But the lodestar here is 3.33 million, the multiplier requesting is 2.62, and in the case your Honor actually approved a multiplier of 2.99.

So we do think the result here is excellent for the class. It's a result of about almost about 50 percent of alleged damages that our expert had opined that he would ultimately sign onto for the expert phase. So we think it is an excellent result. A lot of work has gone into the case. It is well within the reasonable range so, therefore, we do think it is warranted.

THE COURT: All right. I'll ask defense counsel

whether they want to say anything.

My experience is if defense counsel were not, as they are, highly respectful of the process, they would say, Judge, we don't care at all one way or the other.

But let me hear if there is anything defense counsel wants to say.

MR. JANUSZEWSKI: No, your Honor. We really don't have anything to add other than the plaintiff had accurately recited the history of the case and the work that was done and the vigorous opposition that we presented. But we take no position on the application itself.

THE COURT: By the way, I should add, before we get back to the attorneys' fees, I am satisfied that the out-of-pocket expenses is \$688,352.41 and not a penny less. That part is approved.

Let me ask plaintiff's counsel, am I right that when this case settled, there had not yet been certification on the motion that was then pending; there had not yet been substantial discovery, including your depositions of the defendants; and that therefore less work was involved than is true of many of these cases that we have been comparing these to?

MR. LIEBERMAN: Your Honor, I'm not sure about that. I mean, as far as the status of the case and the posture, we had made the motion for certification, we had taken --

depositions of both plaintiffs had been taken, they were scheduled two days after the mediation to have the expert for our class plaintiffs' deposition taken, and there were a number of depositions that were scheduled for just really within a week or two of that mediation. A number of them were already on the books.

At that stage we made the motion, we had taken a significant portion of class discovery, and then we had also received a number of documents that were going to then progress into depositions and onward. I would say we were right in the middle of discovery. We received documents, we had already been through a lot of the process of certification.

Our response in support, defendants had filed their opposition. We were prepared within a few weeks to file our responses in support, it was already drafted, and then we were on the road to taking depositions within a week or two. So that's the posture of the case.

I would say I think that's the posture where a lot of cases do settle in these courts. You're not quite through discovery, you're really right in the middle, and that's where we were.

THE COURT: All right. This is always, the court finds, one of the more awkward aspects of class action proceedings because, well, up to this point, plaintiff's counsel's duty has been to the class. At this point,

plaintiff's counsel's duty is to its firm. No one really speaks for the class.

Yes, theoretically someone could have objected to the attorneys' fees, and the fact that they did not weighs in favor of approval of the attorneys' fees. But that's, I think, a somewhat artificial way to look at it and, therefore, the court is in the awkward position of having to decide a matter without the adversary system really operating.

Defense counsel, of course, as I repeat, doesn't care.

It's the same amount of money out of their pocket regardless,

so...

MR. LIEBERMAN: He's very supportive, your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes, yes.

Well, I'm always impressed when a case settles and we have the preliminary hearing -- I'm not discussing this case just as a general matter -- when plaintiff's counsel suddenly discovers that there were all sorts of marvelous defenses that required them to settle where they did, and defense counsel suddenly discovers that plaintiff had such a good case that they had no choice but to settle.

So this is what I guess they teach in law school.

All right. I'll think about it for a day or so and get you a decision by order no later than end of this week at worst.

MR. LIEBERMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thanks a lot.